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1. INTRODUCTION
Luis Vega and Paula Olmos provide a „logic of public discourse“ (p.3) that is essentially
social. The paper undertakes a very complex endeavour to lay out the conditions
(regulative as well as constitutive) for deliberation as plural agent argument. They do so
by taking up the concept of deliberation in order to shed light on public argumentation,
that is argumentation in the public and by the public. To me, the compelling point of the
paper is the distinction it makes between individual (“monologic”) and interactional
(“dialogic”) reasoning. By arguing against a monological perspective on argumentation in
deliberation, they turn their attention to argument as the product or enterprise by a plural
agent. I shall concentrate on two issues in my response: the role of deliberation in
argumentation studies and the concept of public put to use.
2. DELIBERATION
The concept of deliberation, Vega and Olmos state in their opening sentences, has been
absent from argumentation studies and has „never played a leading role. Not even today”
(1). This finding, I have to admit, took me rather by surprise. The authors point out that
deliberation features as one of the three genres Aristotle distinguished in his Rhetoric.
But apart from its treatment by Aristotle, deliberation (next to the judicial genre) has been
the pivot of the development of rhetoric in the Hellenistic and Roman tradition. And
rhetoric was (at least at that time) the home of what one could call the beginning of
argumentation studies. Hence, for the beginnings of rhetoric, the opposite argument to
Vega’s and Olmos’ could be sustained: deliberation has played a leading role in
argumentation studies. One could, however, argue, as Vega and Olmos do, that the notion
of argument sustained in this rhetoric is that of a single speaker presenting arguments,
hence a monologic notion.
But also for contemporary argumentation studies the statement of the absence of
deliberation from argumentation studies seems at least too strong. Contemporary rhetoric
has a strong focus on public argumentation and public discourse. The studies on the
rhetoric of social movements might feature as an example. Also, Goodnight’s suggestion
for a “New Rhetoric” (1993) as responsible public argument employs deliberation as a
key concept. However, Vega and Olmos are interested in a different aspect of public
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argumentation, they aim for a “logic of public discourse”. The authors define deliberation
as “argumentative interaction in which information, options and preferences are weighed
and handled in order to take a practical decision or resolution, in a responsible and
reflective way” (1). This definition seems closely linked to Habermas’ theory of
communicative action and argumentation (1981, 1983), which is also referred to in the
paper. Habermas’ theory is closely interwoven with his theory of the public as well as his
theory of democracy and has deliberation at its core. Also the regulative conditions
named on p. 6 are very much in accordance with Habermas theory of the ideal speech
situation. However, Vega and Olmos advance this notion of argumentation by stressing
that deliberation has at its focus not the exchange of single arguments but a dialogic
construction of a shared argument.
3. PUBLIC OR AUDIENCE?
Vega and Olmos put their interest in deliberation on a level with an interest in the “logic
of public discourse”. The concept of public underlying this paper is central. At the same
time, “public” is an uneasy concept. Warner (2001) names two predominant notions of
“public”: that of the public and that of a public (p. 413). The former sense refers to a
concept of public as a social totality – it includes all individuals in a certain (most of the
time spatial) category like nation or state. The latter sense is close to the notion of
audience. Once a public is addressed, this public is concrete, preformed and might also be
in bodily co-presence, whereas the public is not an audience but a relation among
strangers. Warner also gives an alternative, if you will third definition, describing a
public as existing “by virtue of being addressed” (p. 413). In this sense it is discourse
itself that organizes the public space by the attention to (p. 415) and the reflexive
circulation of discourse (pp. 420-421).
Vega and Olmos seem to have different kinds of public in mind when they, for
example, name as issues for public discourse “atmospheric pollution, sustainability or the
Third World Debt” (p. 5), which seem to relate to the sense of the public. But at the same
time they state that this kind of public discourse involves “an interpersonal confrontation
of the different participants” with “real bodily presence” (p.5). The latter quote suggests
to understand public as audience, that is a public, in the sense of a specific group of
people. The uneasiness of the concept of the public becomes especially clear when the
authors distinguish between negotiation and deliberation: I would take it that an
important difference between both forms lies in the notion of public. Negotiation is a
form of interaction. Hence it is a frame that always includes specific persons (maybe as
representatives).
These diverse notions of “public” imply different notions of circulation of
discourse (by different media or orally, temporally stretched or temporally compact) and
of participation (participation by giving attention of by being bodily co-present with other
interlocutors). They also ask for very different methodologies for empirical work. Where
public argument in Warner’s sense or in the sense of a social totality would demand a
focus on longer time-spans and could be understood as a process in time, argument in a
public could be researched in short time frames and could rather be conceptualized as
events. I would suggest that answering the question of what empirical research in this
area could look like, would probably lead to a sharpened concept of public.
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4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Vega and Olmos employ the concept of deliberation, that has a long
tradition in rhetoric, for their take on public argumentation. Their notion of
argumentation as a shared task offers the opportunity to view arguments exchanged and
evaluated in public as flexible, that is as not-yet-products, is quite intriguing. It would be
beneficial to formulate the questions posed by the authors also as empirical questions. An
empirical twist, I suggest, would sharpen the concept.
link to paper
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